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IKTRGDUCTIOH 
The  oulture oonoept has  been oallod one of the most important,   if 
not the    ost  important,   oonoept in the  social soienoes   today.    Suoh 
learned men as  Harry Elmer Barnes,  Stuart Chaso, Ralph Linton,  Melville 
Herskovits,   and  Clark .Yissler have been  influenoed  by  it.    Lien for oen- 
turies  have theorized about the  sooietal forces  whioh influenoed them. 
They have wondered,   also,  how their personalities  ojne to be what they 
..jre,  and they have had many explanations  for why things  were as they 
..ere,    une of tho earliest of those was that of magio;   another,  going 
hand  in hand with the first, was  evil  spirits;   and  there were numerous 
others.    Especially  prominent  theories  were founded on the Eoonomio Man 
and the Natural  Man.     The first of  the^e was  prompted by purely material 
causes;  the latter,   by his instincts.1 
Travelers,   upon  returning to their own countries,  would bring 
strange  tales  of customs entirely different from those whioh existed  in 
their homelands,   but these differences  were held to be  caused by the un- 
like biologioal  make-up,  so they in no way affected the   theories,    although 
the word  "oulture* was  used  in oonneotion with the ways  of life  of 
primitive tribes,   it was not  until  I876  that the distinctive  nature of 
"oulture"  was  pointed out.2 
In that year,  Herbert Spencer,  extending Comte's division of the 
organic and Inorganio to  include  a d.tegory of  "super-organioJ  took 
notice of the separateness  of social phenomena from other types  of 
Stuart Chase,  The Proper Study of Mankind,  Mew York, 
Harper & Brothers,   1945.  po9» 
Clarenoe Marsh Case,  Outlines  of  Introductory Sociology.. 
Hew York,  Ilaroourt,   Brace & Company,   1924.  P« 29. 
(2) 
phenomena.     Sinoe  that time the  oonoept of the  superorganio or oulture 
h.s  been  in the  process  of formulation.    There  is  now some oonsensus 
of opinion  about the  use of the  term.1    Today  it implies  a oomplex of 
;iuny oharaoteristios  of v/hioh the  super-organio  u3poot  is  only one. 
There has  been an integration of many of the opposing views  oonoerning 
it.    The evolutionists  and  the diffusionists,  the funotionaiists  and 
the survivalists,  the  psyohologioal oulturists   und the  cultural deter.ninists 
have all  added something to  the knowledge  about culture. 
There still exist fields of disputation, however.     Suoh ft field 
is the disagreement over the  inolusion of  both material and non-r.. terial 
traits  in the content of oulture.     There  is also  disagreement about 
the spread of oulture,   and about  the relation of some personality 
traits  to their cultural  sotting.     The knowledge  of more ways  in v/hioh 
oulture may be  studied  objectively is needed,  us  is more  knowledge 
concerning the  interdependence of the  sooial soienoes  as  a whole.    It 
is to be  hoped suoh knowledge will not be  long  in ooming. 
•md now let us  turn our  Attention to tho following uspaots  of 
the ooncept:     (1)     '.fiiat i3  the oulture oonoept,   (2)    How did it develop, 
(3)    What are  some of the devioes   employed  in the objective study of 
oulture,  and  (4)    Uutt are   some  of the ways  in v/hioh this  oonoopt  has 
influenced the  sooiul  sciences? 
1        Ralph Linton,  The Cultural Baok.rround of Personality, 
New York,  D'Appleton-Century Company,   194^.  ?•  3*« 
(3) 
•.THAT IS CULTURE? 
One of  the most frequently quoted definitions  of oulture  is  thut 
of E.   B. Tylor who  says  "Culture  ...   is that oomplex whole whioh 
inoludes knowledge,   belief,  art,  morals,  law,  oustom and any other 
capabilities  and habits  acquired by man as  a member of sooiety."* 
Ralph Linton says  "A oulture  is the  configuration of  leurned behavior 
und results   of behavior -.Those oomponent eler.ieuts  are shared and trans- 
mitted  by the members  of a particular society."*    Constuntine Pununzio 
approaches  culture from its  institutional aspeot.    He says,   "...  Culture 
is simply the  sum of the  institutions   .   .  .   tho  oomplex whole of the 
institutions  as  those prevail  in a given time or  in a given  plaoe."3 
He regrets  Tylor's  ohoioe of the words   "oapabilities"  and  "habits"  as 
he says, 
■Uan's  oapaoities  ura endowments  of 
nature;  they are faotors  in oulture 
formation but not  in themselves part 
of oulture.     Likewise habits  are  in- 
dividual modes  of action whioh may or 
may not be part of  oulture."4 
John 3illin  believes  that only the non-material or  ideational is  oul- 
ture.     He denies  that suoh material oulture traits as a hammer should 
be included.     Sinoe the pattern of how a hammer  is made,  how and for 
what it  is  used,  all exist in the mind,  the hammer,  itself,  says Cillin, 
is of no importanoe.    Only the pattern should be  oonsidered.5 
1 Edward  B.  Tylor,  irimitivo Culture. 
Hew York,   Brentano's,   1924t  P«  l» 
2 Linton,   op_.  oit., p. 32» 
3 Constantino fanunzio, jjajor Sooial  Institution^,, 
How York,  iixoilillan Co.,   1939.  P»26. 
4 Ibid.,   p.   106. 
5 John Slllin.  The 7/ays. of jjgn. 
Now York,  D'Apoleton-Century Company,  1948.  P«   188« 
(4) 
Sllwood in his definition of oulture takes achievements as the essenoe 
of oulture.  lie emphasizes sooially aoquired behavior patterns—all 
that is learned through intar-oommunioation by means of symbols. But 
he suys, 
". . . the essential part of oulture is to 
be found in the patterns embodied in the 
sooial traditions of the group—that is, 
in knowledge, ideas, beliefs, values, 
standards and sentiments prevalent in the 
group."1 
These relate to the subjootive side of oulture and are "its essential 
ooro."  The overt oulture of a group oonsist3 of its usages, oustoms 
and institutions whioh "are nearly always the expressions of the ideas, 
beliefs, values, and sentiments of the group."  Sllwood, then, as does 
Panunzio, believes that it is the pattern which exists in tho mind that 
is important.  Linton finds that in investigating the oovert oulture, 
however, there is muoh subjeotive judgment involved, and that "it is 
the overt aspeot of oulture whioh is the prinoipal agent in oulture 
transmission."  He makes an interesting distinction between the real 
oulture, the oulture oonstruot pattern—whioh involves a oultural norm, 
and the ideal oulture—or tho oulture as it exists in its ideals. 
A oulture, then, is both oovert and ove*, material and non-material. 
It inoludes all of a society's heritage whioh has been externally trans- 
mitted—all of its arts, teohnios, beliefs, oustoms, and any knowledge 
whioh man aoquires as a member of sooiety.  It is the sum of his insti- 
Charles A. Ellwood, "Culture", in Dictionary of Sooiology. 
edited by Henry Pratt Fairohild, New York, Philosophical Library, 
1944t P. 80. 
Linton, op. olt.. pp. 39-41* 
(5) 
tutions and of his  roles.    It is  that part of his  atmosphere whioh 
is  raanma.de.    It plays  an intimate part in his  life.    It  is  his re- 
ligion,  his  job,  his  reore&tion,  his  role  in the family of whioh he 
is  a part.     It enters  his   lifo before he  is  born through the way  in 
whioh his  mother prepares  for his  ooming and  it is  never  separate 
from him afterward.     It is no aspersion on primitive man's  mentality 
that ha was  unable to see  the part  oulture played  in his   life.    It 
was  aooepted as  naturally as  the  air he breathed. 
Panunzio  lists  the oharaoteristio3  of oulture  as  (l)  super- 
organio,   (2) dynamio  and self-generating,   (3)  of a pattern creating 
order,   (4)  objective,   (5)  humanly useful,   (6)  oumulative,   (?)  self- 
perpetuating.    By superorgunio,  he means  that oulture is  manmade;   by 
spontaneous  or self-generating,  that it arises  without preoonoeived 
plans,  but  through experience  in satisfying needs;   by dynamio,  that 
it  is  always  in flux  and in a reoiprooating relation with man;  by 
pu.ttern-orea.ting order,  that in a oulturo the  significant thing is 
not a specific  objeot but the pattern of how that objeot  is made, and 
used; by objective,   that oulture  refers  to a way of  life as  it exists 
in a given time and plaoe;  by humanly useful,  that  it is  a result of 
man's attempt to adjust in the most  satisfying way to his  environment 
in rolation to his basio needs;  by oumulative and self-perpetuating, 
that  oulture  is  an ever-increasing social heritage that is  passed 
from one generation to another,  and from one  people  to another. 
Culture is oohesivo. It binds a group of persons together. It 
preserves the sooiety, although the ideals it instills in the indiv- 
iduals who  oompose a  sooiety are  often antagonistic  to their personal 
1 Panunzio,  op.  oit.,  p.  23• 
(6) 
well-being,  us  for example, when men are taught to die for their country. 1 
It does  this  by giving individuals  a oommon dim and making for ooherenoe 
in their goals.    It makes  their  aotions  intelligible  to one another. 
Without oulture  a group of persons would   be only a mob and among them 
there would be  all the  confusion of  "a tower of  Babel"  with as  disastrous 
results. 
■A people's  oulture  is  the  sum of 
all the patterns  of behavior,   impressed 
from the  orudle, whioh koep the  group 
from flying into a thousand fragments 
and  help it adapt to nature  and survive 
in  its environment."2 
Culture is  a time  and energy saver.    Without the guide to behavior 
whioh it gives,  each new problem would be  something to  be puzzled over. 
Lien would spend  a muoh  larger percentage of their time  in thinking 
than they do now with a consequently greater expenditure of energy for 
as  Suraner stated, 
"Custom regulates the whole of a man's 
aotions,—his  bathing, washing,  outting 
his  hair,   eating,  drinking,  and fasting. 
Prom his  oradle  to  his gruve  he is  the 
slave of anoient usage."3 
In short,  without oulture,  man would not be man,  but merely a 
slightly higher speoies  of vertebrate. 
Culture  is,  then,   that  phenomenon whioh,  though manmade,  is  itself 
one of the most  important differentiating factors between the behavior 
of men and that  of animals. 
1 Linton,   op.  oit.,  p. 23* 
2 Chase,  0£,  oit.,  p.  62. 
3 William Graham Suraner,  Folkways.  Boston, Oinn and 
Company,   1906,  p.  4« 
(7) 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CULTURE CONCEPT 
Although sinoe  the  time  of Aristotle men had  notioed the 
powerful influenoe of  their sooial  environment,  it was  not until 
1876 that the  "supor-orgunio"  nature of  sooial phenomena was 
reoognized.    In th*t  year,  Herbert Spenoer  extended Comte's olass- 
ifioation of orgunio  and  inorganio to include a third type of 
evolution,  super-organlo  evolution.    Spenoer explained his ohoioe 
of these oategories  as  an attempt to differentiate  between the 
non-protoplasmio  matter found on the  earth,   th*t mu-ttor whioh had 
life,  and a third great body,  not so much of matter as  of produots 
- 
of sooial  interaction. 
In determining whioh speoies  possessed this  lust type of 
evolution,  Spenoer first analyzed the behavior of the so-oalled sooial 
inseots—the  ants  and the  boes.    The.-e  insoots did not possess  the 
true super-organio,  he  oonoluded,   in as muoh as their cooperation 
is  a result of  inborn  qualitiej  muoh as differences   in sex are,  with 
the same parents   produoing off-spring with widely assorted functions* 
Rudiments  of  the true  super-organio were  seen only,  Spenoer said,  in 
members  of the higher vertebrates,  suoh as  rooks, who kept together 
in families  for generations,  drove off strangers,  and had some division 
of labor. 
"Clearly there has been reaohed a 
oo-operation comparable  in degree 
to  that shown us   by those small 
assemblages of the  lowest human 
beings,   in whioh there  exist no 
governments•"* 
1        Herbert Spenoer,  Svnthotio Philosophy.  VI,   "The Principles   of Sooiology", 
I, New York,  D'Appleton & Company,   1883,  p. 7» 
(8) 
Ho determined that those animals whioh aohieved some degree  of co- 
operation,  divialon of labor,  and sooial  interaotion and did  not 
have oonunon parentage,  did possess some measure  of super-organio 
evolution,   but 
"...   having observed thus  muoh,  we may 
henceforth restriot ourselvos to that 
form of Super-organio Evolution whioh 
so  immensely tranoends  all others  in 
extent,   in oomplioation,   in importance 
as  to make  them relatively  insigni- 
fioant—almost too  insignificant to be 
named  at the same  time.    I   refer,  of 
course,  to the form of it whioh human 
societies  exhibit  in their growths, 
structures,  functions,  produots."l 
The foroes  noting on a speoies,  he olassified as  extrinsio and  in- 
trinsic.    The  extrinsio  foroes  inoluded suoh things  as  olimit©,  plants, 
and animals  of the environing region.     The intrinsic foroes  included 
emotional  oharaoteristios,   intelligenoe and tondenoies  of thought whioh 
were peculiar to man.    From these  original sets  of faotors, were derived 
seoondary ones.    First,  the environment was modified by man—forests 
were  cleared,   swamplands  drained,   and domesticated plants  and animals 
produoed  in  increasing  quantities;   speoies  harmful to man were  exterminated. 
All of these  ohanges  meant the difference  between  "a wolf-haunted 
forest or u  boggy moor peopled with wild birds,  and the fields   oovered 
with orops  and flooks whioh eventually ocoupy the same  areas,"   and as 
suoh thoy greatly affeoted  sooial  ohango. 
The  inoreasing size of the sooial unit itself was  an important 
seoondary faotor.    It made  division of  labor possible  and necessitated 
more elaboration of government and  industry whioh in turn fostered 
activities whioh were only possible when there were  large masses  of 
Ibid.,  p.   8. 
(9) 
labor available.  Sponoer listed the reoiprooal influence of u sooiety 
and its parts as another faotor.  Two of the derivative faotors he 
oonsidered as most important, however, wore "the influence of the supor- 
organio environment—the action and reaction between a sooiety and 
neighboring societies" and "that aooumulation of super-organio products 
whioh we commonly distinguish as artificial, but whioh, philosophically 
oonsidered, are no less natural than all others resulting from evolution. 
The orders of these were (l) Material applianoos—from flints to oom- 
plex automatic tools, (2) Language—both in its spoken and written 
forms, (3) Knowledge—culminating in soienoe, (4) Customs— whioh as 
they became more fixed, ended in systems of laws inoluding those of 
religion, and (5) Aosthotio produots. He conoluded, 
■All these various orders of super-organio produots, 
each evolving within itself new genora and speoies 
whilo daily growing into a larger whole, and eaoh 
acting upon the other orders while reaotod upon 
by them, form together an immensoly-voluminous, 
immensely-oomplioiited and immensely-powerful set 
of influences. During sooial evolution these 
influences are ever modifying individuals and 
modifying sooiety, whilo being modified by both. 
They gradually form what we may oonsider either 
as a non-vital part of the sooiety itself, or 
else as an additional environment, whioh 
eventually booomes even more important than 
tho original environments—so muoh more important 
that there arises tho possibility of oarrying 
on a high type of social life undor inorganic 
and organio oonditions whioh originally would 
have prevented it."l 
Spenoer, in spite of his coinage of the torm, did not fully 
2 
realize the import of the super-organio,  "He did not oonoeivo of 
human sooiety as holding a speoifio content that is non-organio." 
1 Ibid.,  p.   15. 
2 A.  L.  Kroeber,   "The  Superorganio",  Amerioan Anthropologist. 
n.s., XXIX,  April-June,   1917,  pp.  187-188. 
(10) 
He dwelt extensively on the inferior ments.1  development of primitive 
tribes,  and  on the  relation of man to his goographioal setting.     His 
belief in the inheritanoe  of aoquired characteristics  further confused 
the isrue. 
The movement toward oultural  objectivity was  founded more upon 
Durkheim's  works than u;,on  those of Spencer.    Durkheim oonoeived of 
social faots   as   "things" and  insisted upon the externality and 
objeotivity  of social and oultural determinants.1    Ten years  after 
the appearance of the  conoept of the super-organio  in Spenoer's 
Synthotlo Philosophy.   Durkheim«s On the  Division of Labor in Sooletv 
was published.    In this  book he sot forth his  conoept of the Collective 
Conscience.     He has  been aocused of a supernatural approaoh and his 
conoept has  been   likened to  Le Bon's  group mind.     The Colleotive 
Consoienoe,  however,  bears  many striking resemblances  to Herbert 
Spenoer's  Super-organio,  and  even more to our present day Culture 
Conoept.     Durkheim said of  the Common or Colleotive Consoienoe, 
"The totality of  beliefs  and sentiments  oommon 
to average  oitizens  of the same sooiety forms 
a determinate system whioh has  its  own  life; 
one may oall it  the collective or  common 
oonsoienoe.    No  doubt it has  not a spooifio 
organ as  a  substratum;  it is,  by definition, 
diffuse  in evory  reaoh of  society.    Neverthe- 
less,   it has  speoifio characteristics whioh 
make it a distinot reality.    It is,  in effect, 
independent of the partioular conditions  in 
whioh individuals  are plaoedj   they pass  on 
and it remains."2 
A. A*  Qoldonweiser,  "Cultural Anthropology" from The History and 
Prospects  of the Social Sciences,  by Harry Elmer Barnes et u1, 
mw York,  Alfred A.   Knopf,   1925,  p.  249* 
Durkheim,  On the Division of Labor in Sooiety.  translated  by 
George  Simpson,  New York,  LlaoMillan Company,   1933.  P»  79« 
(11) 
and then, 
In\™.JhM?"B   lH  th°  N°rth  ***   in  tha  South. in great cities  and  in small,   in different 
professions."-1- 
It ,111 be noted that,   in reference  to  the  above  quotation, Durkheim 
is  using the  collective conscience as  it applies to  "average citizens 
of the  same society*   so the  term would cover a rather restricted geo- 
graphic area and would not be meant universally the .«.,   but  could 
refer to the  ethos  of a  country.    Some basis for the criticism of 
supernatural implications  may be seen in the following,  however: 
"It is  tho psyohioal  type of sooiety,  a type 
whioh has   its properties,   its  conditions  of 
existence,   its  mode of develoument,  just as 
individual  types,  although in'a  different way.»2 
Shadows  of the  culture concept  of  today are also seen in the work 
of Ludwig Gumplowioz who stressed that sooiety did not develop  like a 
biological  organism "but from one social phenomenon to another." 
His statement that  "intellects  of the same general  range of power have 
replaced the accumulations  of earlier generations"  antioipated the 
accumulative aspeot of  oulture.3 
It wan  not  until 1915 that the principles upon whioh the  study 
of culture was  based were set forth in a pointed artiole,   "Eighteen 
Professions"   by A.  L.   Kroeber,  who was   attempting to delimit the 
soope of history  (historioal anthropology,   history,   and  sooiology) 
from soienoe.     Kroeber's professions   inoluded the following* 
"The material studied by history is  not 




Ibid.,  pp.  79-00. 
Ibid.,  pp.  79-80. 
Ludwig Qumplowioz,  Outlines  of Sociology,  translated 
by Frederiok '•/.  Liiore, Philadelphia,  American academy 
of Politioal  and Sooial Soienoe,  1899. p.  19. 
(12) 
"Civilization,  though ourried by men and 
existing through them,   is  an entity in it- 
self,   and of another ordor from life," 
■A oertain ment;.l  constitution of man 
must  be assumed by the  historian,  but may 
not  be used by him as  a resolution of 
social phenomena." 
"True  instincts  lie at the  bottom and 
origins of social  phenomena but oannot 
be  oonsidored or dealt with by history." 
*nd in the fourteenth premise he  refuted the  oonoept of the  "group- 
mind," the  "folk-soul"  and other such approaohes  to the  problem of 
"collective consciousness.* 
"There is  no ethnio  mind,  but only 
civilization."1 
Kroeber developed  these  ideas  further in an article,   "The Super- 
org^nio" whioh appeared in the .imerioan ,LnthropolOi;ist two years  later. 
This  artiole  beoame the most widely known statement in support of  the 
independence  of  sooial phenomena,  and evoked muoh oomir.ent among  leading 
anthropologists  of the time»2    The  article was  an answer  to writers 
who attributed  the achievements  of oivilization to  a more  highly 
evolved mentality than primitive tribes  had and to  those  who  attempt- 
ed to  explain  cultural  phenomena in terms  of man's   original nuture.3 
In  it was  set forth a philosophy of cultural determinism whioh saw 
the  oause of sooial phenomena  in other social phenomena.    Its  author 
believed the  ourront confusion between  the organio  and sooial was due 
to the revolution in ideas  oooasioned by the doctrine of evolution 
whioh men were still  assimilating.     This  idea had oaused 3Uoh a change 
rt. L.  Kroeber,   "Eighteen Professions," .aaerioan iJithrobologist. 
n.s.,  XXVII, April-June,   1915.  PI-  283-284. 
Dorothy P. Gary, "The Developing Study of Culture" from 
Trends in Amerioan Sooiology by George A. Lundberg, 
Read Bain, HeIs Anderson, Hew York, Harper Brothers 
Publishers,  1929,   p.   188. 
B.  Sapir,   "Do '.Ye Heed a   'Superorganio'•?    Amerioan Anthropologist. 
n.s.,  XXIX,  July-September,  1917. p.  WIT" 
(13) 
in thoughts  that even scholars went to extremes   in attributing the 
evolutionary process  to all  sorts  of phenomena.1 
Kroeber admitted,  as  oommon knowledge,  that  all  persons  aoquired 
some  things  through herodity while they aoquired  others  through 
sooiety.     However,   "No one has yet been found to  assert that any 
human being  is  born with inherent  knowledge  of the  multiplication 
table  ..."    Although this was  true,  he said,   the origins  of some 
qualities were  still undetermined.    The prooesses  of biological 
development and  oultural development differed,  he found.    This  different- 
iation had  been too  often ignored.^ 
They differed,  first  in that biologioal evolution was  oharaoterized 
by a  ohange  in the  organise.    For example,  the first bird was  en- 
abled  to fly by the  development of wings—a modification of its bio- 
logical nature—while changes  in culture took place through invention 
without  any disoernible effeot on man's   constitutional nature.     The 
pilot of today is the same  constitutionally  as were his  predecessors 
who oould not fly.     Seoondly,  biologioal evolution was  inseparably 
connected with hereditary prooesses, v.'hile oultural evolution ooourred 
ap^rt from this  prooess.    No individual ever passed on modifications 
of  the  speoies  to his  own parent,   Kroeber said,  but many inventors  had 
passed on modifications of the sooial  environment to theirs.    Third, 
us to the urgument that the difference between man and  animals  lay 
in our more  highly developed mentality and our oapnoity to modify 
our environment  and  so  "rise superior to  suoh lowly needs",  he said. 
1 A.  L.   Kroeber,   "The Superorganio",  p.  164» 
2 Ibid.,  p.   191. 
(14) 
. . . the distinction between animal 
and man whloh oounts is not thut of 
the physioal and mental, which is one 
of relative degree, but that of the 
organic and sooial, whioh is one of 
kind. The beast has mentality, and 
we have bodies; but in civilization 
man has something that no animal has."1 
and he continued, using language as an example of the effect of non- 
inherited and inherited fmotors, 
"To deny that something purely animal 
underlies human speeoh, is fatuousj 
but it would be equally narrow to be- 
lieve that beoause our speeoh springs 
from an animal foundation, and orig- 
inated in this foundation, it, therefore, 
is nothing but animal mentality and 
uttoranoes greatly magnified . . .human 
and animal speeoh, then, though one 
roots in the other, are in their 
nature of a different order. They 
resemble each other only as the flight 
of t bird and of an aeronaut are alike."2 
As illustration of this dependence of speech upon something 
more than heredity, Kroeber oited cases from Herodotus' works, in 
whioh infants, upon being separated from other people by an ex- 
perimenting emperor, were as "dumb as deaf mutes" on being re- 
turned to the sooiety of people many years later.  Another oase he 
presented to refute the argument of "high and low degree" was that 
of the beaver, who was a muoh better arohitoot than were many primi- 
tive peoples.  The difference lay, then, not in degree, but in that 
the beaver's accomplishments were a result of instinct while men's 
were a result of tradition. The animal's instinots were unalterable} 
they possessed them at birth and nothing oould ohange them. Our 
1   Ibid., p. 169. 
Ibid., p. 175. 
(15) 
aooomplishments were a result of a tradition whioh was handed along, 
from person to person only as a message. It had to be oarried, but 
the messenger was extraneous to the news.1 
There were those who fondly oherished the belief In the inher- 
itance of aoquired oharaotoristios as the only hope in civilization, 
Kroeber found. Ward, in partioular, argued thut sinoe man did not 
evolutionize by natural selection, he had to by the aooumulation of 
mental qualities whioh were fixed in him by heredity. To this Kroeber 
answered that it hobbled development just as muoh or more by 
chaining the development of the future to the prosent.2 
'That Kroeber did not see was that this "weakness" was also 
found in the idea of causation of sooial phenomena by other sooi.il 
phenomena. There could be no tremendous leap over a gup of know- 
ledge, as there oould bo no leap, as he assumed, over a gap in 
heredity, but both had to be built on the past. The rute of ohange 
wus not necessarily so gradual when it WRS assumed to ocour through 
•odifications of sooial phenomena, howover, as the time limit was not 
rigidly pre-fixed, as in the oaso of biologioal aooumulations, by the 
small amount whioh eaoh generation oould accumulate and the fairly 
constant life-span of man; there oould be no speeding up of the 
processes of heredity for maturation had to ooour. 
The eugenicists, namely Galton and Pearson, had failed to dis- 
tinguish between the sooial and mental, al30. Two year3 before Kroeber 
wroto "The Superorganio", Pearson had published a study of "Some Keoent 
^interpretations of the Problem of Nurture and Nature", in whioh he 
1 Ibid. . p. 177-178. 
2 Ibid., p. 187. 
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followed a line of reasoning similar in many respects, to that of 
Spenoer. Where Spenoer said that the more baokward tribes of peoples 
lived in inferior physioal environments beoause they had been foroed 
out of areas more favorable to man by superior tribes,1 Pearson said 
that parents of poorer health and habits naturally gravitated to poorer 
sections of the oity by a process of seleotion in whioh they lost out 
2 
to the more  able.       It might be said that both these men were reasoning 
by assuming that oorrelated features  were due to oause-and-effeot. 
Kroeber did not deny that heredity played as  muoh importanoe  in the 
inheritance  of mental  traits as  it did in that of physioal ones,  but 
said that these two were inseparable.    The fault lay,  though,  ho folt, 
in the  aooeptanoe of  accomplishment as a measure for the  limits  set by 
inherited oapaoities.^    He  sums  up the point made by those who be- 
lieve mentality and  psyohio oultural phenomena are two separate things: 
"The reason why mental  heredity has 
nothing to do with oivilization,  is that 
civilization is  not mental  action but a 
body or stream of produots  of mental ex- 
eroise.    LSental aotivity,  as  biologists 
have dealt with it,  being organio,  any 
demonstration concerning it consequently 
proves  nothing whatever us  to  sooial events, 
iientality relates  to the  individual.    The 
sooial or oultural,   on the  other hand,  is 
in its very essenoo  non-individual.    Civil- 
ization,  as  suoh,  begins  only where  the 
individual  ends;  and whoever does  not in 
Prank Hamilton Hankins,   "Sociology",  from The  History 
and rrospeots  of the Sooial Soisnoes.  Hew York,  Alfred 
A.  Knopf,   192J5,  p.  299. 
Karl Pearson, The Relative Strength of Nurture and  Nature.  II, 
Cambridge,  Cambridge  University Press,   1915.  P»  56» 
A.  L.  Kroeber,   "The Superorganio",  pp.  188-189. 
(17) 
some measure  peroeive  this  faot,  though as 
a brute and  rootless  one,  oan find no 
meaning in civilization, and  history for 
him  is  a wearying jumble,  or an opportunity 
for the  exeroise  of art."1 
The biologist takes the  individual as  his  study, but the  isolated 
individual is not the unit from whioh to  study sooiety.    A sooiety 
is  oomposed  of muoh more than a large  group of individuals.    The 
Darwinian theory of evolution was formulated on the basis of the raoe 
as  it related to a oolleotion of individuals.    The Mendslian methods 
of study depended upon the isolating  of traits and individuals. 
Darwin's  and liendel's disooveries  oould be  acoepted without  reservat- 
ion us  to heredity,   both mental and physioal,  but should not be U3ed 
in the  prediction of human behavior.     Kroeber  also believed it was 
futile to uttempt to prophesy the future of nations from analyzing 
the organio make-up of their members. 
Next he turned  to the  "great man"  oonoept  of history.    He  denied 
that suoh men as  Aristotle,  Arohimedes, Darwin,  and Uendel contributed 
-ichievemonts whioh would not  have been made  if they had diod in  infancy. 
While he  agreed that all  inventors had probably been unusually gifted 
men,  he  said,  that,   sinoe there was  usually the same distribution of 
ability in the world at any given time,  great disooveries were determined 
not by  the peouliar oapaoity of any one man to determine a given theory, 
but by the  readiness  of oivilization for that theory,  beoause,  the 
discoveries upon whioh it was  bused had to be  made  beforehand and a 
publio had to be ready to  reoeive  the  invention ind utilize it. 
1 Ibid.,  pp.  192-193* 
2 Ibid., p.  193. 
(16) 
For that reason,  ±>lato,  born into the  Stone Age,  would not have written 
tho Republio;  pistons  and valves hud to be Invented before the  stoam 
engine|  and a disoovery suoh as Mendel's was  ignored during  his  life- 
time only to be disoovered  later  and almost simultaneously by three 
scientists,  when the  oivilization was  ready to make use of it and 
incorporate it into the oulturo of the time.    These  statements  are, 
today,   so obvious  as  to  seem unnecessary, but he was  oritioized for the 
"oultural determinism"  3een  in this and the following oxorpt: 
"'-Tien we  cease  to  look upon invention or 
disoovery as  some mysterious  inherent 
faculty of  individual minds whioh are 
randomly dropped  in space and time by fate 
•  .   • when,   in short,   interest  shifts from 
individually biographio  elements,   .   >  .  and 
attaohes whole heartedly to the  sooial, 
evidenoe  on this  point will be  infinite 
in quantity,  and the presenoc of a raajestio 
order pervading oivilization will  be  irre- 
sistibly  evident,*• 
and, 
"Knowing the oivilization of an age and 
a land, we oan then substantially affirm 
that its distinctive disooveries, in this 
or that field of aotivity, were not direotly 
oontingent upon the personality of the aotual 
inventors that graoed the period, but would 
have been mads without them; and that, con- 
versely, had tho great illuminating minds of 
other oenturies and olimutes been born in the 
oivilization referred to, instead of their 
own, its first achievements would have fallen 
to their lot."2 
Sooial evolution began long after the beginning of organic evo- 
lution, even after the primates evolved, although it was not known 
1 Ibid., p. 200. 
2 Ibid., p. 201. 
(19) 
exaotly when  this  ooourred  it was  in a  series  of forms  more advanoed 
than the gorilla but less  developed than the Neanderthal man.    It 
ooinoided with the missing   link,  said Kroeber,  but this term did not 
give  its full  significance.     "Link"  implied a ohain of evolution- 
something steady and  continuing.    The development of super-organio 
evolution from organio  evolution was  no  continuous  ohain of hap- 
penings  any more than was  the development of  organio  evolution from 
in-organio  evolution but was a  leap to another plane.    It was  the entranoe 
of ft new faotor, whioh at first seemed  inconsequential,  but slowly 
and increasingly gained in dignity.     It was 
"...  a factor that hud passed beyond natural 
selection,  that was no  longer wholly dependent 
on  any agency  of organio evolution,  and thut, 
however rooked  and swayed by the  oscillations 
of  the heredity   that underlay it,  never- 
theless floated unimmorsibly  upon it."1 
In oonolusion,  Kroeber,  drawing on the  "eternal ohasm"  between 
organio  life  and the  super-orgunio  emphasized  the hopelessness  of 
utilizing the methods  of moohanistio soionoe  in the study of what to 
him was  not soionce.    In stating  this,  he in no way ohallangod the 
methodology  of  science,  but believed, while useful in its  own branches 
of knowledge  it would only  lead to  oonfusion in those  of the histories, 
as he classed all sooial  soienoes.    It was  his  oonoept of the separate- 
ness  of  social  phenomena,  however, whioh was to be the foundation upon 
whioh  later students  extended the  soientifio methods  of researoh into 
the social soienoes. 
1 
2 
Ibid.,  p.  209. 
Gary, _pj3.  oit».  p.  188. 
(20) 
Following the  appearanoe of this  highly  significant and  contro- 
versial artiole   in the Anthropolo/.lst.   there were several rebuttals. 
Sapir and Goldenweiser eaoh responded to Kroeber's  conolusion3 in 
the next  issue,   agreeing with some of  his  statements and disagreeing with 
others. 
Sapir folt that Kroeber underestimated the  importanoe of indi- 
viduals  in history.     That while most  individuals were so impressed 
by the culture  in which they lived and  could  only make  a small dent in 
it,   suoh men as Aristotle,  Uahomot,  Jesus,  Shakespeare,  Goethe, and 
Beethoven had not been mere  "oat's-paws*  of general oulturul drift.    Al- 
though,  muoh of what these names meant   might have been due to biased 
accounts  of their  lives,  and muoh of what they did,  to  their sooial en- 
vironments,  it was not entirely so.    In addition,  Sapir thought the 
classes  of phenomena should be in-organio,  organio,  and mental or 
psyohio—not in-organio,  organio,   and super-organio.    The ohasra oame, 
he said,  between the orgunio  and  the mental whioh Kroeber had paired 
together.    The  development of oivilizution was  due,  in his estimation, 
to the capacity  of the human mind  to aooumulate  knowledge,  to  a growth 
in self-consciousness  on the part of men,  and to the  ability to select 
some  of the  total  content of phenomena for his  U3e.     This being so,   the 
psyohio was  relegated to the  oonoeptual  scienoes,  rather than to those 
whioh took their data from reality.1 
Ooldenweiser disagreed on three points.    First,  there was an  "in- 
adequate appreciation of the  role of the  individual in history."    Seoond, 
Kroeber had been  "over-oonfident  in his  assumption of historio deter- 
Sapir, .OD.  o}t..  p.  443 • 
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minism."     Third,   the  identification of psychology and biology wore  "the- 
oretically inadmissable."    He felt that although a theory of cultural 
determinism might have been applicable for civilizations  at largo,  it 
would not apply to a given civilization.    He  agreed that mass  phe- 
nomena and the  law of probability did apply so that with a lurge number 
of inventors  oonoentrating on ono  invention,  it was  likely to be  in- 
vented,  but this  same invention might be made when  there was  low prob- 
ability  if an exceptional mind attempted it.    Finally,  he  emphasized 
that the study of  oulture should be oonsidored as  a dosed stream and 
the individuals  oomposing it studied,   sinoo  they were  affeoted,  not 
only by the civilization, but by their biologioal and psyohologioal 
characteristics;  as  suoh, they were fed by the  stream of oulture and 
fed it in return. 
In 1947i  the questions  raised by Kroeber,  Sapir,   and Goldenweiser 
were  still opon ones  for, Melville Ilerskovits, after analyzing both sides 
of the issue,   could  choose neither wholly the  one,  nor wholly the other, 
and was foroed  to say, 
"liust we ohoose bet.veon the viow thut oulture 
is  an entity in its  own right,  moving  irres- 
pootive of man,  and the  one that holds   that 
oulture is  but a manifestation of the human 
psyche?    Or is  it possible to  reoonoile these 
two points  of view?"2 
For the one,  that  oulture should be oonsidered in its  own right,  he 
pointed out that the  line of history was  so  smooth and  so unbroken when 
1 Alexander Goldenweisser,   "The Autonomy of the Social",  Amerloar. 
Anthropologist. XXIX,  July-September,   1917, p.  449. 
2 Melville J.  Horskevits,  Utn and Ills  ;Vorks.  New York, Alfred A. 
Knopf,   1948,  p.  27. " 
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considered in the  long view that it did make the  role  of the  individual 
seem slight,  but then again,   it  oould be said that,  after all,  oulture 
was the aggregate  of many patterned reaotions—responses made by indi- 
viduals,   as  a result of individuals  reaoting, thinking,   rationalizing. 
The sug total of all these discrete  reaotions  he  called their  "oulture." 
Finally,   he compromised.    It was  all right to oonsider oulture  a separate 
entity sinoe this was the  only way to  "attain an understanding  of the 
range of variation to be found  in the types  of sanctioned behavior that 
achieve the  ends  all men do achieve,"  but it must be realized that it 
vffls  only  set up for usefulness-that  it was only a oonstruot. 
"The danger point  is  reaohed when we 
deify similarities  in behavior that only 
result from the  similar conditioning  of 
a group of  individuals  to  their oommon 
setting,   into  something that exists  outside 
man,  something  that is  superorganio."1 
It might be said to Herskovits  that the  connotation whioh he gives 
to the term "superorganio"  is not the same as  th'it whioh was  originally 
given to  it by Kroebcr,  that it was  never  intended  as a  sort of  "group- 
mind,"  but perhaps  that is   "beside  the  point." 
Dorothy P.  Gary in her interesting piece,   "The Developing Study of 
Culture,"  whioh appeared in  1929.2 divided social  scientists  into three 
groups;  those who  held tho subjective or individualistic  ap^roaoh to the 
study  of phenomena;   those who were not able to aooopt the "wholly objec- 
tive conception of cultural  phonomena;"  and,  these who oonsidered  "all 
social objeots  orouted and interacting in the  (social)  prooess,  suoh as 
tools, folkways,  and mores,   sooial personality,  attitudes,  and soienoe  .   •  • 
equally objeotive."     This  last group gave a new meaning to the  "objective 
1 Ibid.,  p.  28. 
2 Gary, ££•  olt.  p.  28. 
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approaoh to cultural phenomena.■  She found that the old break between 
"subjectivity* and "objectivity" had disappeared and the cultural objeoti- 
vity whioh had aroused ories of "cultural determinist" against Kroeber 
nov/ referred, not to the soparateness of culture and the individual, but 
to the "availability of data for soientifio observation, analysis, and 
verification, while subjectivity referred to the non-availability of 
the phenomena,"  The soientists she plaoed in each group v/ere as 
follows: Subjeotivists—Allport, Freud, and others who approaohed 
oulture through the individual;  Pseudo-objeotivists—Goldenweisser, 
Dixon, Herskovits, Tozzer, Wundt, Sllvrood, "A'issler, Ogburn, and Willey, 
v/ho analyzed oulture in an environmenta.l-psyohologioal way; and 
Objeotivists—Charles and Ifery Beard, Kroeber, Lov.de, Cooley, Park, 
Burgess, and Wallis. She felt the Pseudo-objoctivists did not "furnish 
an adequate basis for a soienoo of culture," and believed that an element 
of the objeotivist approaoh was found in most of the writings of sooi- 
2 
ologlsts and social anthropologists of that time. 
Two books appeared in the 1930's whioh were to open up new aspeots 
of the oulture oonoept. Ruth 3enediot, in Patterns of Culture.-' stressed 
the subordination of all of the institutions of a tribe to a single inte- 
gration of aim. In her analysis of the Zuni, Dobuans, and Kwakiutl, she 
found each tribe seleoted only a United seotion of the wide range of 
variations whioh v/ere possible to their sooiety. She was influonoed by 
the Gostalt psychologists and philosophio historians, in that she 
1 Ibid., p. 185. 
2 Ibid., pp. 175, 178, 185. 
3 Ruth Benedict,  Patterns  of Culture.  Cambridge, The 
Riverside Press,   1934.   passim.. 
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considered, as did Clark VTisslcr, that the whole sooiety was not just the 
sun of its parts, but that, more important, these parts were related in 
a unique arrangement which gave that sooiety its distinotive ohuraotar.1 
Since the premise that every sooiety inherits the sume general range of 
biological make-up is held axiomatio, any variations in the personalities 
of a population as a whole, Ruth Benediot felt were due to cultural 
conditioning. She showed how each of the tribes * members was affeoted 
by his oultural setting. The Zuni were friendly, unoorapetitive people; 
there were few examples of individualism in their group. The Dobuans 
jnC  Kwakiutl,.however, were suspioious, competitive, and showed marked 
individualism in their people. Neurotioism was especially prevalent 
among the latter.  Ruth Benedict oonoluded, that the oauses of psyohotio 
and neurotio states were (l) The oonflict of an individual's inherited 
temperament with the personality pattern aooeptad by his tribe, and (2) 
Inability, on the part of an individual, to reaoh goals set by his 
society. 
o 
Karen Horney, in The Neurotio £orsonulity of Our Time, also dwelt 
on the role a oulturc's goals play in making persons neurotio. In a 
sooiety suoh as ours, the extreme competitiveness needed to attain suooess 
confliots with the Christian preoepts whioh form our ideal oulture 
pattern. This, and the creation of desires impossible to satisfy by high 
pressure salesmanship and advertising, acoount for much of our neurotioism. 
1 Alexander Qoldenweiser-, "Leading Contributions of Anthropology to 
Sooial Theory", Contemporary Soolal Theory by Harry Elmer Barnes 
et al. New York, D'Appleton-Century Company, 1940, p. W* 
2 Karen Horney, The Neurotio Personality of Our Times. New York, HT. '#• 
Norton & Co., 1937, passim.. 
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sinoe they make for  * sense of frustration.    A sooioty *hioh results 
in Urge  numbers  of personality oasualities,  must be siok itself,  she 
ooncluded* 
It is  impossible to  list,   in total,  the oontributions  of the many 
sooial  scientists who have aided  in developing  the oulture  oonoept. 
The  foregoing oontributions  are among the more significant,  but 
the oonoept  itself,   is due not only to these oontributions,  but to 
every idea whioh has  added something to the understanding of the 
importance  of  oulture,  sinoe the  oulturo oonoept has developed—ao 
do all sooial phenomena—through a  prooes3  of minute inventions  heaped 
upon the  pile  of knov/ledge. 
(26) 
SOivIE ucWICSS FOR DEALING IttTH CULTURE 
.Vith the division ©f phenomena into the  inorganic,   tho  organio, 
and tho superorganio or cultural for  praotioal  purposes,  the problem 
of classification of sooial phenomena was  still  in its  very oarliest 
stage.    The amount  of data whioh oould he  plaoed under  the  heading 
"superorganio"  was  tremendous.     This WAS  particularly truo when oulture 
was  used in a general sense  as  meaning all of man's  aooumuKted,  externally 
transmitted,  and  socially aoquired knowledge.    The problem was  somewhat 
simplified by the use of  the term "culture*  to  inolude only those  sooial 
phonor.iena  of a given time  or plaoe,  as   "the Ancient Greek Culture"  or 
the "Chinese Culture."    A student of China,  for inst«noe,   oould then 
list interesting bits  of  information to his  heart's  oontent—that Chinese 
women had their feet bound  in infancy,  that the Chinese had oarriages 
oalled  "rickshas" whioh were pulled by men,  that the Chinese people ate 
worms.     'Jore discriminating observers  might  see  that the Chinese had 
a patriarohal family system or  an ancestral-worshipping religion,  but 
eaoh observer was  extremely  likely to approaoh the  oulture in a more  or 
less haphazard way—soleoting that portion of data whioh seemed to him 
most significant and often  lifting oulture items  out of their settings 
in suoh a way that their  importance was  lost.    Some observers might 
conoentrate on the faot that Chinese women bound their feet to the 
extent  that they did not  see how this fitted  into the pattern of 
Chinese oulture-that it was tied up with the attitude of physical  labor 
as  degrading,   or with that of  the  inferiority and helplessness  of women. 
Nor oould they see how the  custom had begun,  or  .vas  dying out  because 
bound feet were  beooming more of a hindranoe  than an asset. 
(27) 
It was  very difficult to make valid comparisons  between oultures 
beoause   the data oolleoted  about  individual  sooieties was  often non- 
oomparable;  that it was  impossible to rooord  everything  about oven a 
primitive tribe was   obvious,  but whioh portion of the tribe's  oulture to 
reoord was  not. 
Culture,   as  other phenomena,   in order to be handled objeotively 
and uniformly,  had to be olassified in suoh a manner that the  inoorporution 
of elements   into  a culture,  the major parts  of any oulture,  the gradation 
of oulture elements  from the more  simple to the more complex,  the 
impaot  of the oulture upon the society's members,  and the malfunctioning 
of the  parts  of  the  culture  oould be shown.    It was with  this  in mind 
that several  frames  of referenoe were oonstruoted,  whioh,   although 
ambiguous,  as '.Vissler's  "oulture trait"  and  "oulture oomplex" ware  aooused 
of being,    had muoh the sume v*lue  as a pH scale in chemistry. 
One  of the first attempts at olassifioation of data  resulted in a 
systomio  arrangement of the  stops  by whioh new parts  of oulture devoloped. 
This frame of reference was   in the book.  Folkways.  written in  1906 by 
Jilliam Graham Sumner. 
A.  Sumner*s   "Folkways* 
From a study of extensive data gathered from primitive and 
civilized sooieties all over the world,  Sumner showed how folkways 
aevelo^ed,  how they affected human interests,  and how they aoted and 
were aoted on.    First,  foikweys were  defined;   "...  they are not organio, 
1        3ary,  op.   cit.. p.  130. 
(28) 
or material,"  ho said,   "They belong to  ft 3uper-organio system of relations, 
conventions,  and  institutional arrangements."1    In their formation 
there were first the needs whioh men must satisfy.    In attempting to 
satisfy these needs  they ohanoed upon some ways  out of a large  range 
of possibilities whioh produoed greater satisfuotion than others,  and 
followed them repeatedly until they beoamo habits.    Others  of their 
group,  impelled by the sane  need,  also tool: up these ways  of aohicving 
satisfaction.     Through repeated group use  they beoame oustoms.     As  "instinots" 
were developed in  oonneotion with the mass  phenomena the oustoms  ohanged 
into folkways.    Sumner says  of the folkways: 
"The folkways,  at a time,  provide for all 
the  neods  of lifo  then and  there.    Thoy 
are uniform,  universal  in the group,   im- 
perative,  and invariable.    As  time  goes 
on,   the folkways  become  more and more 
arbitrary,  positive,  and  imperative.    If 
asked why they aot in a oertain way in 
oortain oases,  primitive people always 
ansv/er that it is  booause they and their 
anoestors  always  have done so.    A sanotion 
also arises from ghost fear."2 
He emphasized  that folkways were made unoonsoiously, with their  aim only 
the s-tisfaotion of the need at hand,  but  that they oame to dominate 
so muoh of the  lives  of primitive peoples  that it was said that pre- 
literute  men were the  "slaves  of anoient usage,"  and modern man was only 
slightly less   so,   having "a  little wider variation of voluntary  »otion."3 
Often these folkways were due to a false oonolusion drawn from 
cause-and-effoot reasoning,     Suoh a thing happened when a  oitizen  of 
1 Sumner,   op. oit..  p.  iv» 
2 Ibid.,  pp.  2-3. 
3 Ibid.,  p.  4. 
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Portugal died at Uolembo and soon Afterwards  a pestilenoe broke out. 
The natives   thought the pestilence due  to the white man's death and 
.vent to great trouble to  prevent another suoh oocurrenoe.    To them this 
seemed  the best possible explanation,   and as  suoh they incorporated it 
into  their folkways.    Sunnier found many cuses  in contemporary  oulture 
in whioh the folkways were based on no more  logioal reasoning than that 
shown  in the  folkways  of the  primitives. 
,Vhen the folkways were evaluated as necessary for the sooial welfare 
they beoame  mores  and of a oompulsive nature.*    tJores were the unwritten 
laws whioh "oould make anything right."    Sumner  oited oases in whioh 
horrible punishments  were inflicted,  publio  houses  of  prostitution 3ot 
up,  and the courtship oustom of "bundling"   oarried on—all without any 
consciousness of wrongness,  beoause it was   in the mores  of the  time 
and what was wrong,   itself,  differed from oountry to  oountry depending 
upon the mores whioh the people sanctioned. 
"The  mores  are the folkways  including the phllosophioal 
and ethioal generalizations  as  to sooietal welfare whioh    _ 
are  suggested by  them and inherent in them,  as  they grow." 
There was a oonsistenoy among the mores as there was among folkways, 
because  they fulfilled needs  best when cooperative.    This   led persons 
to generalize and form "prinoiples"  upon whioh they mistakenly assumed 
peoplo  aotedand whioh they considered the oausative faotors.    For 
example,  some of the  less  common mores  oaused by ohanges  in the conditions 
of life were  responsible for the humanitarianism in modern society,  not 
o 
the mores due to the principle of humanitarianism.-' 
1 Ibid., p. 30. 
2 Ibid., p. 30. 
3.      Ibid., p. 39. 
(30) 
Out of the mores oame the  laws whioh to bo effeotive had to bo 
busod on existent mores.    They took the mores out of the unoonsoious and 
put a penalty on their observanoe.    In primitive times,  taboos  took 
the  plaoe  of  laws;  when a itaffl was  reaohed in whioh men no longer 
feared the ghosts  of their ancestors  too greatly to be  oritioal 
of folkways,   laws were enaoted to take the plaoe of the taboos.1 
Prom the folkways--developed,  first,  into oustoms  and then into 
inoros—appeared oresive institutions  suoh as the family,  the government, 
and religion whioh were composed  of  a concept and a struoture by whioh 
the oonoept or notion was  brought about.    MtaB through invention and 
conscious forethought,  speoifio institutions were established as were 
banks,  they were oalled  "enuctod  institutions."     3ehind these also 
2 
lay,  however,   a long  line of oommon usages. 
Next oame the  ■ethos"  of the group,  or,  "the  totality of oharaoter- 
istio traits  by whioh a group is  individualized and differentiated 
from others."     It was  the group ethos whioh led to distrust on the  part 
of the in-group for the out-group,  or for "foreigners."3 
Sumner's  classification then,  arranged in order of increasing 








1 Ibid., p. 55, 
2 Ibid., py. 53-5k- 
3 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
(3D 
The usefulness  of this grouping is apparent when one notes  that, 
after over forty years,  it  is  still one of  the most widely used 
u.pproaohes  to  the study of oulture, 
B.    Frames Used by Wissler 
The unit Clark VYlssler ohose for his  frame of roferenoe was  the 
tribe and was  oharaoterized  by politioal unity,  speeoh uniformity, 
and geographioal oontinuity.     Culture,  then was  the  "aggregate thoughts 
und deeds  of the tribe."1    The tribal  oulture was  oomposed  of (1)  oulture 
traits,   and  (2)  oulture oomplexes. 
Culture traits were the  small units whioh when enumerated added 
up to  the whole  oulture.    They were units  of observation.       They were 
not independent  objects  as were potatoes dumped together in a bushel 
basket,  Tissler  speoified,   but bore a funotional  relation to one another. 
,Yhen a tribe had the habit of consuming   wild rice,  for example,  there 
v/as  a fixed oycle  of activities to be pursued—the gathoring, hulling, 
and cooking  of the rioe all  involved many distinct culture  traits—and 
when these were all  related  to one another  to o.rry on a total motivity, 
they beo*me  "u. trait oomplex."3    The sum of a sooiety's trait oomplexes 
formed the  culture. 
"Ihon all of  the  cultures   of the world were classified according to 
the similarity of  the trait-oomplexes  they oontained,  they were divided 
into "culture types."    For  example, Wissler said,  there was  a fairly 
common type  of dress whioh Indian v-omen of the .Vestern United States wore. 
2 
3 
Clark *issler, ifen and  Culture. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company 
1923, pp. 48-49. 
Ibid.,  p.  50. 
Ibid.,  p.  52. 
(32) 
When other oulture tru.it oomplexes of those Indians were oonsidered 
and found to vary around a common norm, us did the dress, oultures in 
,/aioh these traits wore assooi-ited were of a llMill■■ oulture type. 
"Hence, by typo of oulture yre  mean a norm, or standard form, of tribal 
oulture roadily distinguished from others." 
All types of oultures, '.Vissler held, to have a oommon fundamental 
structure, although they differed in the oontent whioh formed this 
struoture.  "The same general outline v.lll fit all of them."2 This 
outline he divided into nine oulture complexes. As it has been used 
repeatedly as a guido to the study of primitive oultures, we are 
inoluding it here. 
"The Culture  Soheme"^ 
1. Speech 
Languages,   .vriting systems,  etc. 
2. liaterial Traits 
a. Pood   habits 
b. Shelter 
c. Transportation and trade. 
d. Dress 
e. Utensils,  tools,  eto» 
f. 'Weapons 
g. Ooouputions and industries. 
3. Art 
Carving, painting, drawing, musio, eto. 
>4,     mythology and Soientifio Knowledge. 
5. Religious Praotioes 
a. Ritualistio forms 
b. Treatment of the siok 
c. Treatment of the dead 
6. Family and Sooial Systems 
a. The forms of marriage 
b. Liethods of reolconing relationship 
o. Inheritance 
d. Sooial oontrol 
e. Sports and games 
1 Ibid., p. 55. 
2 V/issler,  op.,  oit.,  p.  75< 
3 Ibid., p. 74. 
(33) 
7.     Property 
a. Real  and personal 
b. Standards   of value und exchange 
o.    Tr~de 
8*     G-ovarnment 
a. Politioul forms 
b. Judioial  und  legal prooedures 
9.     V/ar. 
Even  the Australian aborigine, v;ho some  said had no oulture,  foil under 
this  outline.     For  example,  although he did not wear olothes, he  did wear 
ornaments  so would be  considered as having  "dress."    '.Then his oulture 
was  studied ourefully,   .Vissler believed all of the other trait-oomplexes 
would also be found.       There were oertain  aotivities  essential to the 
survival  of humans  around whioh the  complexes  developed and these needs, 
common to mankind,  resulted  in a frame  of sooiety which was  everywhere 
the same.     There were many ways  of solving the needs,  however, and the 
oontents  whioh filled in the frame  and gave  it oharaoter differed. 
C.    Chapin's  Type Parts of an Institution 
In  1928,  P.  Stuart Ghapin  sought to give ft oross-seotional view of 
.-.a institution.    Chapin's  framework gives  a very minute examination of 
this  aspect of  culture. 
The  oharaoteristios  of the  institution,   as Ghapin defined it were: 
first,  institutions  arose out of  grouped individuals  who v.-ero  joined 
around the satisfaction of come  basic need or drivo suoh as  sax,  hunger, 
or fear;   and seoond,  the  "type-parts"  of an institution were  of four kinds, 
(1)  conventionalized behavior patterns and oertain reoiproouting attitudes 
suoh as affection,   loyalty,   cooperation,   (2)  symbolic oulture traits  to 
whioh emotional value was attached and which wore stimuli  to  behavior 
conditioned to them  (the  idol,  cross,  ring or  flag.),   (3) technical cultural 
1        Ibid.,  p.  76. 
(34) 
traits  invented to make for a more adequate  satisfaction of  oreature wants 
through bettor adjustment to the environment  (buildings  and  shelter), 
(4)  a  "heritage"   of the  "desoription and specification of the patterns 
of interrelationship among elemental drives,   attitudes,  symbolic oulture 
traits,   and utilitarian oulture traits"   ..hioh wore  externally stored and 
handed on in  oral or written language* 
'.Than he  analyzed four great institutions  of sooiety,  he  saw the 
following distribution of traits:2 
Type'p'rts'of     .       Family State Religion Industry 
Struoture 
1, attitudes     •       Love Devotion Reverence Fair play 
and behavior                .iffeotion          Loyalty               Fear Loyalty 
patterns                .       Dovotion            Respeot               Loyalty                   Cooperation 
Loyalty Domination        Devotion Confliot 
Parental- Subordination      A.ve 7/orkmanship 
respeot Fear Subordination      Thrift 
2. Symbolio       .       Marriage Flag Cross Trade murk 
culture                               ring                 Seal                     Ikon                         Patent sign 
traits                    .       Crost                   Bnblem                 Idol                         Advertising 
Coat-of- National Shrine emblem 
# arms anthem 
Heirloom Army, Navy        Altar 
3."  Utilitarian  '   *Home equip-'  'public  ' Churoh Stores,  shops 
culture . ment buildings buildings Factories 
traits Personal Public works    Cathedral Ships 
property Warlike equip-    Temple Railroads 
mont Sanotuary Muohinery 
Altar 
i." Orll'or '   '.'   '.Till TwitlM '       'flwj*' Franchise 
• ^-     ssr- Sao"dbook   -»i.rrs 
Incorporation 
1 F. Stuart Chapin, Cultural Change, New York, The Century Company, 
1928, pp. 45-46. 
2 Ibid., p. 49» 
• 
(35) 
All  of the preoeding characteristics were oapable of objeotive 
study,   Chapin suid.     Even attitudes  had been quantitively measured. 
D.     Linton's   "Unequal Participation in Culture" 
A devioe  especially useful  in dealing with the  relation of culture 
to personality '//as  that formulated by Ralph Linton in 1936*    Linton 
accounted  for  the wide rango of variations   in sooiety by the inability 
of any of a group's  members  to participate  in the total  culture of the 
^roup  sinoo the sum of  knowledge was  too great*    Even  if for no other 
reason,   differences   in  sex would oause differences  in participation and 
so eaoh person had  roles  he must play  lying outside the experience of 
many of  his   oompatriots.     This dii'ferenoe  in role3 and in the seotion 
of the  culture whioh affected one was  responsible,  said Linton, for suoh 
things  as  dissimilarities  between olasses',  between culturally isolated 
groups  and the whole sooioty,  and between religious groups.      His   list 
of the degrees  to whioh the  content of a culture were  participated in by 




The universalities were things whioh everyone in the group shared, 
for instauoe, the dress, language, housing, -ind group ideals. The 
specialties affected only part of the group; they were seen where there 
ma a division of labor between the sexes or difference in occupations. 
In addition there were the alternatives-varieties of approved ways open 
to individuals for satisfying their needs. Such varieties were seen in 
amusements,   recreations,   and hobbies.    A fourth classification,  sometimes 
1        Ralph Linton,  The Study, of Jfe  Hew York,  0 -Appleton-Century 
Company,   1936, p. 277. 
(36) 
added,  was that of  "Individualities."    These were the  individualized 
modes  of bohavior whioh everyone  possessed to some degree,  and  it was 
through the popularization of these  ecoentrioies  that new elements were 
incorporated into  the  already existent oulture. 
The universalities  und  the specialties  of a sooiety were  aooopted 
by the group as   "right"}  if  neoessary, they were  justified by 
rationalizations.     Sinoe  the  universalities  aooentuuted  things  oommon 
to the  experience  of the group and  the specialties,  the interdependence 
of the group,  they v/ere  of  a oohesive nature  so  thut a sooiety composed 
mainly of  these was   likely to be stable.    Alternatives  and individualities. 
introduced new modes  of  aotion or ways about which there wore oonfliot 
2 
and ft  oulture  in whioh they  predominated was  consequently less  stable. 
E.    Ogburn's   "Cultural Lag"-' 
In 1922,  William P. Ogburn formulated the theory that strain 
existed between two parts of I oulture beoause of a lag  in adjustment 
between the parts. 
For  example,   in the early 1800's  the United States had a very 
ill population.  With huge  forests  available.     The polioy pursued  by saaj 
persons then was  one of  exploitation of the woodlands.    There was no 
attempt at reforestation or  oonserv itittt.     As  tho  population grew,   the 
need for wood grew, but the area in forest lands decreased. As a 
result of cutting away the trees whioh held the soil in place -uid 
prevented the running-off of water, floods caused a groat deal of 
damage.     The process  of securing legislation to prevent exploitation 
1 Ibid., pp. 272-274. 
2 Ibid., pp. 282-283. 
3 This device, although not a frame of r-fer.no. has be.n found 
espeoially useful in diagnosing social ills. 
!;■ 
(37) 
of the forests was  a  slow one.    It  began about  1904 and is  still  in- 
adequate.     Ogburn's  diagram of this  lag  between  changed material 
conditions   and  adaptive oulture was as followsJ 
2 
Line  1 represented the material conditions  in regard to  the forests— 
the inoreesed need for forests,  and  lino  2 represented the adaptive oulture- 
the usage of the  forests. 
Point  "a"   represented the need for a  ohange  in the adaptive  culture, 
point Hb",  the  ooourrenoe of the ohange,   so that between points a and b 
there was   a maladjustment between the material culture,   in this  oase  the 
independent variable,  and adaptive oulture,  the dependent variable. 
Lags   in parts  of oulturo  arc created by population ohanges  and 
sooial  inventions, but the  most frequent  oause  of  lags,  at present, ure 
the result  of  technology advanoing at a more rapid  rate than the sooial 
institutions with whioh it assooiates.2    A veiy serious  lag,  today,  is 
duo to the  increased invention and  production of destruotivo weapons, 
,hile  the social maohinery which would enable us  to utilize these techno- 
logical disooveries  in a positive manner,   loiters  behind. 
The  "Cultural Lug",  together with Sunner's  system of folkways, 
Chapin's  "Typo P«rts  of an Institution,"   and Linton's   "Unequal 
Participation in Culture"  give a  -jumpine-off-plaoe"  from whioh to 
1        William Fielding Ogburn.  Social Chunse, New York,  The Viking Press, 
Ino.,   1922,  pp.  203-213. 
2        Ibid.,  p.   210. 
(38) 
approaoh tho study of oulture.    They MM tangible,  applicable to sooial 
phenomena as  they  aotually  exist at a given time  and plaoe,  and oommonly 
enough aooepted by sooiologists  and anthropologists to be steps  forward 
in a more thorough approach to the study of culture. 
R«w that we  have  looked at the devioes  themselves  let  us show how 
they oan be  used.     One  of the more fruitful areas  of oultural study is 
that of our own oountry.     These tools  are   of great use  in. analyzing 
something whioh we  are apt to approach so  subjeotively.    In the study 
of Amorioan  oulture they furnish a frame work: whioh can give coherence 
to our  resouroh and make for greater objectivity,  assuming,  first,  that 
we realize that our ways  are  as  much a result of oulture as  are those  of 
any primitive tribe. 
The oulture soherae  lists  nine major parts ooutained by any oulture. 
,'e find that we have  speeoh,  material traits, art,  mythology and soientifio 
knowledge,   religious  practices,  the family and sooial systems,  property, 
government,  and war.     Suppose we  analyze the food habits of  the American 
people,  a subdivision under material traits. 
There  are folkways and mores  in food habits  as well as   in other  areas- 
we do not eat  certain foods-ruts,  snails,   or worms,  nor do  we eat each 
other.     Snails,  for example,  might be very  good roasted.    In some other 
oulture,  they are  eaten,  but »  do not.    This  is  not because there  is 
anything inherently bad  in snails-it may be  that they  contain many 
vitamins,  but for most  of us  they are just  not  eaten.    » for prohibitions 
against oannabalism,  our idea  of the wrongness  of  cannibalism was 
derived  through the  accumulations  of experience which lie back of  our 
culture,   ami  passed  through the  stages  of habit not to  eat  people, 
(39) 
folkway not to  eat  people,   oustora not  to oat  people, until finally it 
v/as felt degrading  to sooiety to suoh uti extont that it beoume onoof 
our  strongest  aversions. 
Turning to '.Yissler's  oulture trait  and culture oomplex—we find that 
the can-opener  is  * oulture  trait. . There  is an aooepted way of using a 
c-.n-opener—you out a hole  in the top of  a oan of food whioh has  been 
preserved by the  destruotion of food-spoiling baoteria.     The pattern 
of the  oan-opener with  its  accompanying  pattern of usage and all of the 
things with v/hioh it  is   involved—the oans of food,  the method of oooking, 
the pattern  of disposal  of  empty  oans  all  go  to make up a part of a 
oulture  oomplex—the use  of  of-nnod foods  processed  outside  of the home. 
Cultures whioh have muoh the same oulture oomplexes as ours, with 
somo variance, of oourse, form a oulture type to v/hioh not only we but 
the British,  Prenoh,  and  other nationalities might  belong. 
The family is   one of the great  institutions Chapin lists  under his 
"Type Parts  of an Institution."    Currying the analysis of tho food habits 
of a family along under the headings  he  lists we find there is a distinct 
behavior pattern surrounding  eating.    This  behavior pattern passes  under 
the name  of  "table  manners."     There is  a symbolic oulture trait in the 
family initial  on  silver.    Utilitarian oulture  traits might include 
plates,  silver,  napkins  or any of the many things associated  with 
eating,  or preparing the food.    Oral or written  specifications  could 
include  the reoipes  or oook books. 
The  section of  culturally acquired ways of eating to which a  person 
1. exposed may affeot his  per.oaalit.7-or be a distinguishing feature 
by which others  of his  group recognize  him.    So that  eating according 
(40) 
to a given oode may mark him as  belonging  to a  certain class  or a 
given religious group.    The varieties of foods  he  eats  may very well 
affeot not only his  physioal appearanoe,   but his  p3yohio*l state as well, 
And it  is  here that a lag may ba found  between ohangod material 
oonditions  and  adaptive culture.    Sedentary workers  do not need as many 
oalories as  do more active workers,  so that when patterns of eating 
are not changed as  bodily  noods ure,  a lag may ooour and result in 
widespread obesity. 
These are   some  of  the ways  in which devioes  for studying oulture 
can be  used  to give more objectivity,  more aoouraoy,  and a more valid 
approach than we  formerly  had,  and because  of the  interrelationship of 
the social sciences  more preoise  studies  in anthropology or sooiology 
will have some effeot  on other fields. 
an) 
SOLE APPLICATIONS OF  THE CULTURE CCMrLSX 
'.'/o have  attempted to  show something of tho nature  of the  oulture 
oonoeot,  how it developed, what methods are used to study it,  and wh~t 
so:ne of the  inf luenoes  are upon the  sooial soieuoes   in general. 
There oun  be no doubt that it opens up bright new vistas  in the 
ap^lioation of  the  soientifio  method  in tho  sooial soienoes.    AS 
Stuurt Chass says,   "The  oulture oonoept gives us the olosest fit to 
the truth about mankind yet disoovered by tho soientifio method  .  .   .'ll 
•,7e will not  attempt to  disouss fully the  inf luenoes whioh the 
oonoept of tho  oultural anthropologists  has had on the sooial  soienoes. 
There have been four general ways  in whioh they have  influenced the 
other disoiplines,  ho./evor.    They  luve  led to  an increasing recognition 
of tho  synthetic aspect of  the  sooial  institutions  and consequently of 
the 800ial  soienoes;   they have helped  to bring out the effoct whioh a 
culture  has  upon the  personalities  of its -members;  they have aided in 
supplying  a more  objective approach to the  study of  sooial phenomena 
and toward the  solution of  problems  of society;  and,   they have furnished 
data on primitive tribes  whioh has  given us  a better perspective  or. our 
O t 
ov/n society. 
The  definition of oulture as   "that complex v,hole which includes 
Pledge,  belief,  art/morals,   law,  custom and any other capabilities 
and habits  acquired by man as  a member of  sooiety,'3 helps  to bring  into 
focus  the fact that society  is not built on any given segment of a man. 
1 Chnse,  op.   oit.,  p.  65« 
2 Ibid.,  pp.   59-60. 
3 Tylor,  op,,   oit..  p.   !• 
(42) 
It emphasizes   that  society is  not  just the study  of man's  S°vernment, 
religion,  state,   or  ethios,  but  is  the  totality of these things  in relation 
to one  another.    Ogburn's  demonstration of  b*w a  change  in one part 
of culture  affects  other parts  of  it brings  into  relief something 
whioh,  although  recognized,   economists,   students  of religion and 
government,  judges,   anthropologists, ethnologists,   and social  psychol- 
ogists  frequently ignore.    Too often eaoh branoh of knowledge has  been 
so oreoocupied with formulating  laws v/hioh vould covor man's behavior 
in its  ovvn field,  that  it has  completely overlooked the fact,  that,  after 
all,  a man is not merely oonoerned with his  job,  his  family,  his  religion, 
his government  or any of the  other parts  of  the oulture  in whioh he 
participates,   but with all  of these  at the same  time,  *nd  that  a situation 
in any one of these may affeot his  behavior in the  others.       That a man's 
business  troubles  oan make  him grouohy at home  is  too commonly aooepted 
to be questioned,  as   is  the  role  of governmont in setting  limits to  his 
praotioes in almost  any facet of hie  lifej  he is  not allowed, for instanoe, 
to fondle snakes   in his  religious  rites  nor  to punish his  child too 
severely.    This  complexity in a single man's   life,  beoomes  even greater 
v;hen man is  studied in groups.     No  single faoet of a sooiety's behavior 
can be  separated from the other parts. 
« 
Scientists  have  from time to  time felt this  synthesis  of human 
relations  so  important that they have advocated the setting up of a 
special  overall  soienoe, v/hioh, while not neglecting or attempting to 
replaoa the specialized  branohes,  would give a broader basis  for study. 
Chase, op.  oit., p.  199« 
(43) 
Ralph Linton says, 
"Out of  the  collaboration of suoh .Yorkers 
(workers  in  the fields  of Personality Psyohology, 
Sooial  Struoture,  and Cultural yuvthropology), 
there is  beginning to emerge a new soienoe 
devoted  to the dynamios  of human behavior."-!- 
This may or may not be neoessary.    With the increasing cooperation 
of the  sooial  soienoes  there is  likely to be an enrichment of all  the 
fields  by ideas whioh have penetrated from the others.    This  is  not 
to say that   sooial  scientists   in the  past have not cooperated and borrowed 
from eaoh other's   discoveries,  for they have;  the nature  of their 
study would make  it impossible for  them to  totally ignore  all fields 
but their ovvn,  but  it is  also too  true that they have not oooperutod 
actively,   and  have  spent far too large a  part of their time in sniping 
2 
at ©aoh others  disoovorles. 
In  studying the  effect whioh a culture has upon the  personality 
of its members,  there  are two difforent approaches.    The first is   to 
study the  sooiogonic  in relation to the genio oharaoteristios  of persons 
to find whioh traits  are  inherited and whioh are not, then the full 
extent of the  culture's   influence upon the  individual can be seen. 
The students  of culture  have  aided  in disproving the existence of many 
so-culled  "instincts"—traits whioh were held to  bo common to all 
members  of the  human species,  suoh as  the  acquisitive  instinct and 
the combative  instinot were  supposed  to be,   or,  traits which were  held 
to be duo to  the  individual's  endowment by his parents,   suoh as  instinctive 
Linton,   op.   oit.« p. xiv, 
/,'illiam P. Ogburn and Alexander Goldenweiser, Jhj, ^cial Soienoes. 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927, pp. >*• 
(44) 
lying,  or  instinotivo  laziness,1    It may be remembered  that it was 
purtly  the exoessive use of  "instinots"  as an explanation for human 
behavior whioh led Kroeber to write  "The Superorganio."     .'fhile they 
have not been so  aotive  as the psyohologists  in disproving the  presenoe 
of non-universal  instincts   suoh as some  believe to be  inherited by off- 
spring, _,they  have,   through analysis  of  sooiul phenomena,  made suoh a 
ood ouse for  oulturally conditioned responses as  the  cause  of  human 
2 
■actions   that the  "instinots"  have lost some of their potenoy. 
The seoond approach to  the  study of human personality in relation 
to culture  is  the  oonfigurutive approaoh.    Ruth Benedict's  book, Patterns., 
of Culture  is  the  olassio  in this field.    It is  an analysis of the ways 
in whioh a specifio type  of oulture operates  to produoe the  personality 
norm of that  oulture.     She  found  that  there was  a  correlation between 
the individual's  traits  and  those of  his society.    Two  of the tribes 
surveyed,  the Zuni  and  the Kwakiutl,  were diametrically opposed  in 
temperament.     The  Zuni,  who  exhibited restraint in all of their social 
institutions,  were of an easy-going,  unemotional personality type.    The 
Kwakiutl,  on  the  other  hand,  gloried in excess.     Their personality norm 
was a highly neurotio  and highly temperamental individual.3    This study 
opens  up new fields  in the  social  sciences.    Hot only does  it  show the 
groat  adaptability  of  the human  species,  but it gives us  cause to ponder 
our own  society• 
1 J.  R.  Kantor.   "An Essay Toward an ^"fj^^'ggj V^ ^ 
Psychology,"  Amerioan Journal of Sociology., XXVII,   1922 
pp.  624• 
2 Gary, ££.  oit..  pp.   178-100. 
3 Benediot, passim. 
4 Linton, op., oit., pp. 501-502. 
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The  oulture oonoept and the oultural anthropologists  have aided  in 
applying a more  objeotive  approaoh to the study of social phenomena.    They 
have done this  by their insistance upon the objeotivity  of oulture.    They 
stress  that  sooial phenomena are  oaused,  not by some abstraot  law,  but 
by other sooial  phenomena.     Sinoe primitive man did not  select the 
phenomena whioh were  incorporated into his  oulture with a long-range 
view,  but  in order to  satisfy basio needs  of the moment,  any attempt 
to read  rationality into his  actions  is  hopeless.    This  is the  short- 
coming of suoh theories  as that of the  "Sooial  Contract"  upon whioh 
muoh of our ourrent thought  is  based.       To attempt to probe  into the 
seorets  of sooiety,  then,  one must deal with speoifio  responses  to 
specifio  stimuli.2 
Fersons who  interpret  sooiety through the  individual are  at fault, 
also,   in that it  is not the  individual himself who is  signifioant but 
the processes  and  interaotion of whioh he is  a part.     Clark '.Tissler 
says,      , 
"...  professionals  in sooial soienoe are  still 
far from confident  that they have  their hands 
upon the  sooial reality.    True,  many attempts 
havo  been made to  find  the  basio factors  in 
society,   but  these faotors  have  been sought, 
for the most part,   in the laboratories  of 
biology and psyohology   ...  On tho other hand, 
oxperienoe with sooial phenomena  is  bringing 
us  nearer and nearer to a realization that we 
must deal direotly with life  itself,  that the 
realities  of  sooial soienoe are what people do."3 
1 Chase,  op.   oit.,  p.   199» 
2 iumtor,  oja.  oit..  p. 772. 
3 Clark Wissler,  Preface  to 
Merrell Lynd,  New 
p. v. 
Iliddletown,   by Robert S.  and Helen 
York,  Haroourt,   Braoe and Company,  1929t 
(46) 
With the  realization that arm-ohair theorizing is no  longer the answor 
to a knowledge  of mankind,  American sociologists  and anthropologists 
have  ooae out of their "ivory towers"  to observe that whioh aotually 
exists.     They have oomo to  realize,  that not only do  primitive peoples 
have a  eulture,  but that we  ourselves do,  and that it  is  neoessary to 
study this  oulture  to find what makes  it  "tick."1    Anthropological 
studios  of our way of  life are  appearing in increasing quantities. 
Among  those   that have been published are the Lynd's  Lllddlotown.   Vest's 
rlainesvilic.  U.  S.  A..  Blumenthal 's  Sma 11 Town Stuff. Hioks • Small 
Town,   and ^uiderson's  Home  Town,  the Face  of iuaerioa. 
The dita  oolleoted by the anthropologists  in their researoh on 
primitive tribes has  been of great use to the sooial  scientists.     It 
has  furnished  a  basis  for  comparison to highlight the features  of 
oivilized oulture.    The data  for the most part had beer, oolleoted 
with more emphasis upon oddities  than on the  oulture  pattern of the 
tribe as  a whole.    As  Ralph tinton says, 
"...  until very  reoent times,   faots   of this 
sort have been oolleoted  in a spirit muoh the 
same as  that of the amateur  oolleotor of 
Indian relios.     The oustoms  of non-European 
groups were  treated as  ourios with whioh to 
astonish the uninformed,  and the  rarer and 
more  bizarre they were  the greater the  pride 
of the disoovorer."2 
and 
"'.Vriters   of this  period  always took the oustoms 
of  their  own sooiety for granted,  and even 
fifty years  ago the description of a  modern 
European  oulture  pattern,  unless  it was that 
of  some  isolated  peasant community, would have 
1 Chase,   op.   oit..   p.   122. 
2 Linton,  op.  oit..  p.  29* 
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been oonsidered as  muoh out  of plaoo  in an 
othnographio treatise us  a kitohon knife  in a 
oabinet full  of arrowheads."1 
By showing how institutions  of the  primitive tribes grow and 
change  in the  prooess, we oome to have  an idea of what our own civiliza- 
tion mist have been like  in its  early  stages,  and we  oan learn to some 
degroe what  the  possibilities  are  thit  it oan be  ohanged to ameliorate 
sonn of the  oonditions we  believe to be  harmful.     Culture does  change, 
although very slowly.    This,  itself,  is  a safeguard for society,  sinoe 
it protects   the  members from  impraotioal  schemes which might result 
in disaster  if,   overnight,  great  innovations were made,  but  it also 
demands  of all those who hope for better  things,   a great deal of 
patienoe and a neoessity to  realize that  "No  reform oan over bear fruit 
2 
unless   it is  grafted successfully to the  living tree of oulture." 
In addition to the effects the oulture  concept has had on the 
sooial soienoes   in general,  we might  list a fow of the more speoifio 
ways  in whioh  it affeots them.    In sociology the  oonoept has  been 
widely acoepted  and has  done much to direct attention from the formula- 
tion of absolute  sooial  1MB  to  the study of things as  they actually 
exist.     In eoononios  it hes  suggested that  economio  change  is  only oao 
among many typos   of sooial change3 and  that no oulture exists  for very 
long at the  -st,rk survival  level-  or  is   prompted by a  purely materialistic 
philosophy.    This would make the  "Economic Man"   of the classical 
1 Ibid., p.  29. 
2 Chuse,  op.   oit•,  p.  66. 
3 R.   K.  Molver,   -Sociology-,  Snoyolopedia |g the Sgojal  Soienoes., 
XXIV,  New York,  MaoMillan Company,   1934.  P* »•*• 
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economists a fallaoy.  One of the contributions to ethios hM been to 
show there is no set of behavior patterns whioh are everywhere "right" 
or everywhere "wrong"; although eaoh sooiety has morals, the things 
2 
whioh they onoourage or forbid  differ from culture  to oulture. 
iJolitioal soienoe  is  affeoted since analysis  of oultures  show the state 
to be  a sooial   oreation responsive to  sooiul demands,3  and wherever 
there is  "tribe  feeling"  it  is  possible for almost any  type  of government 
to exist.       In world  .government it suggests that  no  one  form of govern- 
ment  oan be  imposed on all peoples,  because their oultures  differ so 
widely as to make it  impossible,     and in law,  that  individuals are not 
ulways  responsible  for their  aots.    It has  oontributed to history 
by giving a framework for viewing faots  in relation to other faots 
and helping  the  historian to  roalizo  his  assumptions  and state them 
in torms  of the values  his  society holds at the tine.    In addition 
it gives tools with whioh to approach the study of society.6    In the 
study of  psychology it emphasizes  the part the  sooiety plays  in 
shaping the  individual,?  and an approach to the study of  the individual 
in rolution to   th? norms  of the  society.8    To sooial psychology it 
1 Chase,   op.   oit.,  pp.  82,  83,  195* 
2 Durkheim,   0£.  oit..  p.  398. 
3 Uolvsr, ££.  oit..  p.  2^2. 
4 Chase, ££.   oit..  p.  84,  85. 
5 Ibid.,  p.   275. 
6 Caroline P. Ware,  The Cultural Approach $1JUfj«» *■ Y°rk 
Columbia University Press,  1940,  pp.  Il«   12,  9J. 
7 Linton,  Cultural  Baokr.round  of Personality,,  pp.  29-30. 
8 Chase,   oja.   oit..   p.  63» 
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says  that ma.n is  neither rational or  irrational and that we oannot 
deal with "suoh an  entity as man  at all,  but rather must consider speoifio 
individuals  under speoifio  oiroumstances."*    The use  of the oulture 
oonstruct  (Linton's  group norm)  makes  it  possible  to  prediot behavior 
with a high degree  of success. 
Those  are  but a few of the many wuys,  some muoh more subtle,  in 
whlob the oulture  oonoept has  brought new ideas  to the sooial  soienoes 
und helped to  bring  knowledge of the  super-orgmio  portion of sooiety 
more nearly  into aooord with that  of the organio  and  inorganic.    The 
oulture oonoept  is  but one of many inventions  whioh may aid in 
aooomplishing this.    That it has  definitely helped to aooomplish it 
seemc  oortxin. 
1 Kantor,   op.,  oit..  p. 777 • 
2 Linton, .on..  oit«,  p.  46 • 
(i) 
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